Four days ago, I suggested that Dean's suggestion that we internationalize the Iraqi deployment was based on a phantom military capacity in the rest of the world.

Andrew Sullivan has written a piece for the New Republic covering Dean as well as the idea of internationalization. The point that strikes me most in his article is that Russia blocked the kinds of internationalization (mostly through the UN) that we seek in Iraq today. They supported their "little brother" Serbia (a policy that worked really well for them in 1914) and so America fought a war in Yugoslavia (now a geographical term) with the support of some of its NATO allies. Germany, it can be argued adopted an irresponsible policy of early recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, which I think precipitated the early (Croatian) phase of the war of Yugoslav disintegration. Sullivan doesn't mention German in this regard, but does note that she is refusing to cooperate in Iraq, as well as pointing out that any contribution she could make to the force structure is small.

Bringing back the UN requires safety, and no one can provide that except the United States and the forces that are there now. Any additional forces in the world are either A) not capable of operations in a hostile enviroment B) not able to leave hostiles who are nearby (say, India who can't leave Pakistan), or C) we don't wan't them (no Chinese paratroops, thanks). The same is true for internationalizing the military there. Units that may know how to fire their weapons aren't neccesarily capable of offensive action against a determined foe. They can offer some deterance, but only some. US forces, with their battle proven capability, offensive action training, and laser guided bombs offer substantially more deterance and ability to back it up. Once things get quieter in Iraq, the number of troops that could be brought in grows substantially.

Andrew Sullivan states this observation as follows: "But in their vague and convenient allusions to an "internationalization" option that simply doesn't exist, they are mistaking fantasy for reality." He then follows it up with this conclusion:

"Worse, they may be coming up with an option that they themselves know is unfeasible--merely in order to keep a distance between themselves and the coalition's fate in Iraq. That's putting short-term partisan gain over serious grappling with national security. Which is what many of us suspected of the Democrats in the first place. "

Its worth a read.